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The semiotics of intercultural exchange:
Ostensive definition and digital reason
HORST RUTHROF
Abstract
The paper distinguishes two forms of intercultural exchange, negotiation
between cultures at a personal level and global exchange. In the ﬁrst case,
Ostensive Deﬁnition appears to be crucial. The paper attempts an inter-
semiotic rehabilitation of OD in response to Wittgenstein and Quine. In
global intercultural exchange the ‘universal grammar’ of digital reason
appears to be the crucial component to be analysed. Both forms of nego-
tiation, the paper argues, rely on Vorstellung as an essential ingredient.
Yet Vorstellung is missing from the traditional theorisation of both OD
and the digital bitstream. The paper concludes with a ubiquity thesis of
Vorstellung.
1. Introduction
Understanding a culture means entering its iconicity not only in its semi-
otic manifestations but also in the way a culture typiﬁes its perceptuality.
Both the analytic tradition and post-Saussurean structuralism up to its
postmodern extensions have found it hard to reconcile our languages
with our perceptual being in the world. From a post-Peircean standpoint
this amounts to saying that our dominant discourses about language have
failed to account for iconicity in the broad sense.
Consider the following example: Four semioticians are sitting on a
beach near Marseilles, in turn pointing at their big toes and saying ‘wode
da muzi,’ ‘mon gros orteil,’ ‘meine grosse Zehe,’ ‘my big toe.’ From this
initial attempt at intersemiotic ostensive deﬁnition the four progress
rapidly towards more and more involved intercultural negotiations un-
perturbed by Wittgenstein’s and Quine’s objections.
In this paper I want to explore four theses which I believe are relevant
to the semiotics of interculturality and globalization:
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in need of intersemiotic rehabilitation;
2. Electronic binary-digital reason appears to function as a universal
deep grammar facilitating interculturality on a global scale;
3. Yet there seems to be something missing in digital reason;
4. We require a ‘corporeal turn’ in linguistics to give a satisfactory
description of how interculturality works, with an emphasis on cul-
turally guided Vorstellung as a crucial ingredient of the linguistic
sign.
2. Ostensive deﬁnition rehabilitated
Let me begin with a few quotations on ostensive deﬁnition from Wittgen-
stein’s later writings. Wittgenstein distinguishes between ostensive deﬁni-
tion and ‘ostensive teaching of words’ as ‘an important part’ of our lan-
guage ‘training’ as children (PI: 6). But he rightly asks, ‘Are ‘‘there’’ and
‘‘this’’ also taught ostensively?’ (PI: 9).
For Wittgentsein ‘ostensive deﬁnition, is ... a language-game on its
own’ (PI: 27). But how in this language game ‘can the number two be de-
ﬁned?’ (PI: 28). For ‘an ostensive deﬁnition can be variously interpreted
in every case’ (PI: 28). And ‘how someone ‘‘takes’’ the deﬁnition is seen
in the use that he makes of the word deﬁned’ (PI: 29). That means that
‘the ostensive deﬁnition explains the use — the meaning — of the word
when the overall role of the word in language is clear’ (PI: 30). I would
suggest here that the potential relation of the words of the phrase ‘this is
my big toe’ to other words in English is clear only to the extent that the
ostensive deﬁnition permitted on the beach.
Wittgenstein presses the point further by asking ‘could one deﬁne the
word ‘‘red’’ by pointing to something that was not red?’ (PI: 30n). And
he adds ‘any deﬁnition can be misunderstood’ (PI: 30n). As to intercul-
tural constructions, Wittgenstein notes, ‘someone coming into a strange
country will sometimes learn the language of the inhabitants from osten-
sive deﬁnitions that they give him; and he will often have to guess the
meaning of these deﬁnitions; and will guess sometimes right, sometimes
wrong’ (PI: 32).
As semioticians, we would wish to extend his frame of inquiry seriously
at this point: the longer this person lives in that country, i.e., the more
ostensive deﬁnitions he is given, the more often he will be right, rather
than wrong, until he uses the new language like a native speaker. Further-
more, it is not possible never to be given ostensive deﬁnitions, because the
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linguistic use in relation to nonverbal acts.
In The Blue Book Wittgenstein brieﬂy compares verbal and ostensive
deﬁnitions. ‘The verbal deﬁnition, as it takes us from one verbal expres-
sion to another, in a sense gets us no further. In the ostensive deﬁnition
however,’ Wittgenstein concedes, ‘we seem to make a much more real
step towards learning the meaning. One di‰culty which strikes us is that
for many words in our language there do not seem to be ostensive deﬁni-
tions; e.g., for such words as ‘‘one’’, ‘‘number’’, ‘‘not’’, etc.’ (Wittgenstein
1972: 1) This, I suggest, is not correct, for semiotic reasons summed a
little later.
Because ‘ostensive deﬁnition allows many interpretations (pencil,
round, wood, one, hard, etc.)’ and because ‘if we had to name anything
which is the life of the sign, we should have to say that it was its use’
(Wittgenstein 1972: 2, 4). Unfortunately here Wittgenstein retreats to his
intersyntactic conception of ‘use.’ ‘The sign (the sentence) gets its signiﬁ-
cance from the system of signs, from the language to which it belongs.
Roughly: understanding a sentence means understanding a language.’
(Wittgenstein 1972: 5) At the same time he rejects iconicity as playing a
part in ‘thinking.’ ‘Thinking is essentially the activity of operating with
signs [by which he means linguistic signs, for] ... if we think by imagining
signs or pictures, I can give you no agent that thinks’ (Wittgenstein 1972:
6). This position, I believe, is in need of ‘iconic’ rebuttal.
Nor is it quite right to say that ‘a word has the meaning someone has
given to it’ (Wittgenstein 1972: 28). What we should say is ‘whenever we
use a word we endow it with a meaning that we think is appropriate ac-
cording to standard use or that we think allows us to deviate from stan-
dard use.’ Certainly, for Wittgenstein ‘it is not the purpose of the words
to evoke images (It may, of course, be discovered that that helps to attain
the actual purpose)’ (PI: 6). I will suggest that Wittgenstein’s ‘can-rule’
is actually a ‘must-rule.’ Because he has restricted his analysis to visual
semiosis, he is unaware that iconicity is a broad ﬁeld, including olfactory,
gustatory, tactile, and other nonverbal forms of semiosis.
A counter argument could run like this: We now know that we can
distinguish thousands of olfactory nuances while we have only a handful
of verbal equivalents in our natural languages. This suggests that when
we imagine, e.g., remember a speciﬁc smell interpretation, an iconic sign
cluster, it is very likely that we are not in a position to ﬁnd the right
word, because there is none, but opt for the word or phrase that seems
to us to get as close as we can to expressing our Vorstellung. From this
angle the critique of ostensive deﬁnition appears ﬂawed in the following
ways:
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analysis. We are in a very di¤erent position if we replace singular oc-
currences by a number of appropriate series: one series in which the
object remains constant but the number varies; one series, in which
the number stays the same and the objects change; a series in which
the verbal deixis ‘this’ and the corporeal deixis (pointing) remain
constant while the objects vary; a series in which the colour remains
the same while the objects vary; a series in which the shape remains
the same but weight, roughness of surface, degree of transparency,
etc. vary, a proven Husserlian exercise. Even in the simple thought
experiment of our semioticians on the beach, such ‘intersemiotic
games’ literally incorporate Wittgenstein’s ‘language-games,’ a possi-
bility he himself sometimes allows for (‘Speaking is a part of a form
of life’ [PI: 23]), but fails to prioritise.
2. Even in his later work (Philosophical Investigations, Zettel, the Blue
and Brown Books), Wittgenstein had not fully shaken o¤ his Fregean
inheritance and remnants of calculus thinking. Wittgenstein is aware
of both these constraints. At one point he says that when we ‘con-
stantly compare language with a calculus’ we are engaging in ‘a very
one-sided way of looking at language’ (Wittgenstein 1972: 25). And
in Zettel, he concedes ‘The style of my sentences is extraordinarily
strongly inﬂuenced by Frege’ (author’s translation, Wittgenstein 1967:
712). This bias shows in a number of assumptions, such as the prop-
ositional nature of thinking (Frege’s ‘pure thought’ as the Sinn of a
sentence); the elimination of Vorstellung (Frege’s rejection of Vorstel-
lung as subjective); and the singularity of evidence (Frege’s singular
example of Venus as morning and evening star to argue ‘Sinn und
Bedeutung’).
3. Wittgenstein failed to take his iconic notion of ‘form of life’ as the rad-
ical new basis for his Philosophical Investigations and align his deﬁni-
tion of meaning as ‘use’ accordingly. I suggest that had Wittgenstein
freed himself more forcefully from calculus thinking (even his ‘use’ is
backed up the analogy of playing chess, a purely syntactic or matrix
mathematical operation) and instead taken his insight of ‘form of life’
more rigorously as his new basis of inquiry, he would have felt forced
to opt for a larger frame: the intersemiotic frame of cultural and inter-
cultural practice. The fact that Wittgenstein once refers to ‘form of
life’ as ‘the given’ strengthens my suspicion that had he lived longer
he might very well have revised both ‘use’ and ‘form of life.’
4. From this perspective we can redeﬁne Wittgenstein’s meaning as ‘use’
as ‘the activation of linguistic signiﬁers by nonverbal signs according
to social instructions.’
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nonverbal signs constituting the semantic deep structure of linguistic
signs.’
6. A similar critique applies to Quine’s untranslatability thesis. When a
native on the hunt points to a rabbit and shouts ‘Gavagai,’ the ob-
serving linguist assumes that the native means ‘rabbit.’ Quine shows
convincingly that ‘this translation is insu‰cient to ﬁx the reference of
‘‘gavagai’’ as a term,’ an example of the ‘indeterminacy of reference,’
earlier called ‘inscrutability of reference’ and ‘ontological relativity.’
(Quine 1993: 53) For the native could have an entirely di¤erent ontol-
ogy and so could have meant ‘rabbit time slice’ or ‘it is spring.’
As in Wittgenstein, Quine’s isolated example entirely distorts what is
going on in intercultural encounters. What is missing in this single event
focus and calculus approach is the dimension of time and hence any
possibility of evolution. Even the most disparate cultural ontologies will
yield, sooner or later, a common platform from which translation will be
able to arise. As it turns out, an essential feature of this platform is our
shared physiognomy. After all, Quine’s native is not from a distant
planet, a Star Trek shape shifter, but one of us. At a certain level, all cul-
ture grows out of the ontic and epistemic facts of our biological bodies.
We all drink, eat, are born, and die, even if cultures place these activities
into di¤erent value pyramids. It is this biosemiosic baseline that enables
us to avoid the pitfalls of Wittgenstein’s and Quine’s problematic and
gradually, by trial and error, climb the ladder of interculturality.
Not surprisingly, when Quine’s invokes mental states such as thought
experiments, such as an imagined linguist relying on his ‘translation man-
ual,’ he proves himself ill equipped. What is lacking is a fully semiotized
scenario of which the linguist is a part. Only when we broaden Quine’s
perspective can we account for intercultural translation as a negotiatory
approximation. What Quine needs is an argument for the activation of
multiple sign systems in interaction. When we look at the ‘gavagai’ exam-
ple from such a broadened, and hence more realistic, angle we notice a
crucial di¤erence: we have what we could call ‘intersemiotic triangula-
tion’ (a kind of semiotic ‘cocked hat’) as a minimal measure or ‘inter-
semiotic polyangulation,’ an intersemiotic form of ‘overdetermination.’
In cultural practice, in time the uptake of ‘gavagai’ will become as reli-
able an approximation to the other culture as is possible.
Yet such is the atomistic approach to language that it must preclude
cultural semiosis. And even the Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investi-
gations, hailed as the great breakthrough to ‘ordinary language’ philoso-
phy, fails the Kantian test of teleological projection, the dialectic between
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culture, and the details we observe about it. For without casting a wide
speculative interpretive net, intercultural negotiation is doomed.
7. The elimination of Vorstellung from language semiosis is illegitimate
for the following reasons: Fregean verbal descriptions are no guaran-
tee for objectivity. We do not carry dictionaries in our heads that we
rattle o¤ when we think of a term such as ‘democracy’ or ‘oppres-
sion’; and when we test the ‘deﬁnitional’ grasp of students in the class
room we will ﬁnd that the descriptions vary quite drastically amongst
individuals.
At the same time, Vorstellung is by far not as subjective as Frege
thought. Every culture teaches its members to conceive of the world
and even their fantasy worlds in typical rather than random ways.
The Stasi in the GDR knew this better than Frege when they asked
children in kindergarten to draw the images of TV clocks. Oval
clocks assured them of loyal citizens; round clocks revealed parents
who watched West German news. So much for the alleged subjectiv-
ity of Vorstellung.
8. I wish to place special emphasis on the necessity of interpretive holism
in matters intercultural. In a semiotic review of Kant’s Critiques,
which would read them in reverse, beginning with the most complex
form of reasoning, reﬂective and teleological reason and then pro-
ceeding to the di¤erent forms of reason of ethics, induction and de-
duction, the Critique of Judgment would be the one to look at for
methodological guidance. For the revolutionary moment in the Third
Critique is the creative leap of stipulating a heuristic frame which
stands in a dynamic interpretive relation with the details we wish to
test under its stipulated umbrella (A digital parallel is the mouse of
our PC which allows us to pinpoint speciﬁcs only after we have set-
tled on a new frame of vision). Intercultural interpretation is the
example par excellence of the necessity to project a non-given whole
within which particulars can be interpreted to make sense.
While in the other Critiques at least one side of the judgment equation
is secured, in the Critique of Judgment Kant introduces a discursive for-
mation in which neither subject term nor predicate is given. Whereas in
deductive (pure) reason both subject and predicate are resolved by re-
course to deﬁnition, in inductive (synthetic a priori or applied deductive)
procedure a given formal rule is applied to empirical facts, and in practi-
cal reason a stipulated moral rule is applied to the interpreted fact of so-
cial acts, reﬂective reason invents both its rule and the frame within which
the judgment is to be regarded as valid, that is, attuned to community
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ciﬁc observations into a pre-given scheme, the reﬂective judgment invents
a general law suitable to the interpretation of speciﬁcs. This reversal was
what inspired Charles Sanders Peirce to speak of abduction,( CP 5.189; cf.
also CP 5.145; 5.171; 5.480; 6.497) a variant of Kant’s rule ‘die reﬂektier-
ende Urteilskraft soll unter ein Gesetz subsumieren, welches noch nicht ge-
geben’ [reﬂective judgment is to subsume under a law that is not yet given]
(author’s translation, CJ: 312). In other words, we must invent the rules
of interpretation as we go along. I note in passing for the beneﬁt of those
amongst my colleagues who have so vigorously disputed Peirce’s debt to
Kant, that Peirce explicitly refers to Kant in a late entry to the e¤ect that
phenomena ‘present that mixture of freedom and constraint, which allows
them to be, nay, makes them to be teleological, or purposive.’ (CP 7.570)
But, as Kant insists, it is us who decide which interpretive frame is the
most appropriate in light of what is given and against the horizon of a
community-sanctioned paradigm.
Intercultural negotiation is a prime candidate for this kind of proce-
dure. Since no frame of interpretation is pre-given, we have to invent a
purposiveness, and to proceed as if we knew the systemic coherence of
the other culture as a whole. There are two important insights here: one
is that the judgment of any phenomenon needs to be embedded in a large
conﬁguration (heuristic coherence of necessity); the other is that of cre-
ativity. We cannot simply read the reﬂective telos o¤ the complexities;
we impose it as a ‘spin’ on the data. Here we have passed from the critical
to the speculative-critical Kant and to the revolutionary moment of the
Third Critique: there is no limit to the kind of framing conditions we wish
to project for our interpretations, as long as they allow for the phenomena
we think constitute the whole. Each interpretive frame is merely heuristic;
it is invented in order to allow us to proceed with our forever provisional
reading. This applies to both judgment of nature and works of art, except
that in art we do not foreground practical application. We can now ab-
stract from Kant’s two main examples, art and nature, to the level of
large scale phenomena in general, such as culture. At this level what re-
mains of the principles of interpretation in art and nature is the heuristic
form (‘ein heuristisches Prinzip’) of the reﬂective judgment. (CJ: 355)
Here Kant employs a dynamically stipulated telos for ‘reﬂective reason’
which does not make any deﬁnitive claims but rather functions as a ‘reg-
ulative principle of cognition,’ permitting the imposition of order on what
would otherwise remain for us chaotic (CJ: 312). Since we are missing
‘the key’ to such large scale phenomena as nature or culture, the relations
so ordered are ‘regulative’ relations relative to an interpretive scheme (CJ:
387). Reﬂective reasoning under its projected telos can be no more than a
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‘a kind of causality’ (CJ: 309) in order to make complex phenomena
‘erklaerbar’ [explainable] or, more precisely, ‘erkennbar’ [cognizable] (au-
thor’s translation, CJ: 307). This is not an ‘objective claim,’ for if we were
to apply determining reason to such large scale systems as nature, we
would be guilty of a ‘dogmatic’ use of concepts (CJ: 329). Reﬂective rea-
son is needed when we wish to speculate on coherence in the absence of
adequate experience (CJ: 332). Since we in no position to observe a
culture’s purposes as ‘intentional’ or as a closed system and so cannot
proceed deductively, we speculate on its possible coherence. Kant insists
that ‘the one manner of explanation [reﬂective] excludes the other [deter-
mining].’ This is why in the interpretation of complex systems we should
replace ‘explanation,’ which is determining, by ‘exposition,’ its critical-
speculative alternative. (CJ: 356f.).
Since in reﬂective reasoning both the subject side of the statement
and its predicate are unstable, there is no ground for speculative-critical
judgments ‘inside’ the equation; its ground lies outside the discursive for-
mations employed and indeed outside the subject performing the act of
judging. It lies in the social, the sensus communis, the interpretive commu-
nity (CJ: 156¤.) This makes sense only if we remember Kant’s distinction
between two kinds of subjectivity, the merely subjective realm of likes
and dislikes, and what he calls ‘subjective universality,’ better translated
today as intersubjectivity. Subjective universality incorporates community
expectations, as Kant illustrates when he speaks of the ‘expanded hori-
zon,’ a judgment that anticipates and responds to the possible objections
of our fellow citizens. (CJ: 158; Ruthrof 2004)
Preliminary conclusion: Vorstellung, then appears to operate at two
distinct levels, at the micro level of the linguistic signiﬁed in the sense
that Vorstellung provides us with intersemiotic, iconic signs from which
we select appropriate clusters for the semantic activation of our empty,
arbitrary signiﬁers; and at the macro level by allowing us to project gen-
erous interpretive frames that grant ‘heuristic coherence’ to our assump-
tions of the other culture. Without these two fundamental ingredients
interculturality, I think, cannot come into existence.
3. Global interculturality and the digital bit stream
3.1. Digital encrypting
It is ironic (is it not?) that it was engineers and not philosophers who have
provided us with a universal deep grammar for all cultures: the electronic
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computer nerds have ushered in the possibility of global interculturality.
When in 1952 US scientists developed semi-conductors they opened the
way to the revival of a dormant form of mathematics, Boole’s nineteenth
century binary digital code, to be harnessed in ever more compact elec-
tronic circuitry. Lyotard (1984) rightly points to the 1950s as the dawn
of a new techno-logos, heralding the postmodern era. In spite of the
long-sustained debate whether we are actually dealing with a recognizable
new epoch or whether we are still in the ‘incomplete project’ of modernity
(Habermas 1971, 1974), there is no doubt that a radical semiotic shift has
occurred, a shift from the industrial machine age to the age of machine-
monitoring by electronic circuitry. No doubt the ‘incomplete project’ ar-
gument has political philosophical force, but it fails to account for the
radical change of global interaction from a relatively slow process of in-
dustrial internationalisation to the sudden, high-speed transformation of
economies and cultures on a global scale.
While the Newtonian conceptions that linger on in traditional machin-
ery could be bypassed by individuals as by entire cultures or absorbed at
a rate they thought compatible with their self-interpretations, no such
choice is a¤orded by the digital bit stream. It is ubiquitous and un-
avoidable. The most remote Chinese village is beginning to embrace
laptop, mobile phone and TV channels addressing hundreds of millions
of viewers in today’s China. But it is not the electronic machinery as
much as their shared deep semiotic processes that produces the global
results. No matter what language, political system, and cultural value
preferences, they are all equally and rapidly expressed by the semantically
indi¤erent bit stream of 1s and 0s channelled through the logic gates of
electronic circuitry. The fundamentalist terrorist’s message to blow up a
target is received by intelligence services in the very same manner it was
sent: through the oriﬁces and the AND, NAND, OR, NOR and ﬂip-ﬂop
gates of electronic devices. The high-speed bit stream assumes the role of
a special semiotic: a new, though hidden, universal grammar.
3.2. Cultural e¤ects of the digital
When Ju ˝rgen Habermas wrote ‘Science and technology as ideology’ he
was doing more than just o¤ering Ludwig Marcuse a special seventieth
birthday present. He achieved what was then a major breakthrough in
the debate about the possibility of a more ‘human’ technology, as Mar-
cuse had thought possible. Habermas’s paper knocked that idea on the
head for good. By way of an elaborate distinction between ‘symbolic
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that human social rationality and machine rationality have fundamen-
tally opposing ideologies, the former optimizing ‘emancipation,’ the latter
ruled by the ideology of ‘maximizing output and control.’ And in the
absence of any e¤ective political will in the ‘public sphere’ technocracies
would replace what is left of democratic societies, in which case human
symbolic interaction will become obsolete and replaced by ‘purposive ra-
tionality’ (Habermas 1971, 1974).
In the digital age, a similar critique is needed, investigating the semiotic
base of electronic machinery. While there is by now a vast literature from
Baudrillard to Virilio (1995, 1986), from Jameson to Poster (2002), elab-
orating digital being and its social conﬁgurations, little attention is being
paid to the minutiae of the cultural e¤ects of the semiotic deep structure
of the Boolean code. What interests us here in particular is the relation
between cultures and how they are likely to be a¤ected by the new ‘uni-
versal grammar.’ Even though the bit stream is deeply buried in the body
of the digital machines and looks indi¤erent to the values and judgments
its transports at electronic speed, it does have semantic e¤ects which ex-
actly mirror what goes on in the logic gates. Light speed bits in combina-
tions of 0’s and 1’s, packaged in bytes of eight produce indirect semantic
e¤ects of: seriality, replaceability, speed, indistinction, indi¤erence, forget-
ting, dissolution of subjects, availability, shelvability, masking mediation,
repeatability, either/or as well as ‘and’ syntax, the chain reaction of the
textual, data ﬂow, fusion of the actual and the ﬁctive, fragmentation, de-
historicisation, random access, dissolution of reference, dissolution of dei-
xis, rapid creation, rapid satisfaction of desire, packaging, and high-speed
delivery, exchangeability. These syntactic features of the bit stream pro-
duce at the same time a new social style, a new cultural semiosis, as well
as a ‘digital politics’ and so a new ‘body politic’ (Savat 2003: 184–197).
Such semantic e¤ects produce, I think, the cultural ideology of the digital.
3.3. Cultural imperialism
Given this intrusive force of digital semiosis, it is not surprising that there
has emerged a substantial literature addressing the question of ‘cultural
imperialism’ since the transfer of both digital machinery and its semiotic-
semantic e¤ects typically occurs as a transformation of technologically
less advanced cultures by advanced capitalist cultures, the US, Europe,
and Japan. Amongst the myriad of digital machinery, it is media imperi-
alism that tends to be singled out in the critical literature (McCargo 2003;
Curran and Park 2000; Thussu 1998).
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cultural imperialism, as well as other forms of interculturality, appear to
be e¤ective: at the level of media content; the level of media discourse; and
the level of the digital bit stream.
1. In intercultural global exchanges, media content tends to be blunt,
sometimes brutal, and e¤ective in cultures unable to maintain control
over local content. In China, for example, this is not the case. Sta-
tions such as the CCTV or CETV, broadcasting from Beijing at times
to over 900 million viewers, as well as provincial stations, very much
determine their own programming, with an overwhelming emphasis
on local Chinese traditional and contemporary content. And even
the Hong Kong based Phoenix station, owned by Rupert Murdoch,
on the whole o¤ers Chinese programmes to its viewers in Hong
Kong as well as across the border into China. So where a culture is
self-assured and powerfully managed by its political regime, cultural
imperialism by media content is largely ine¤ective.
2. It is a di¤erent story at the level of media discourse. Here the global
inﬂuence is much more insidious, e¤ective, and much more di‰cult
to control. Slick programming styles, non-indigenous TV genres, such
as talk shows and shows with audience participation through elec-
tronic feedback are beginning to have a noticeable e¤ect even on the
most stubbornly proud cultures, such as China. From this perspec-
tive, Rupert Murdoch’s Phoenix station plays a powerful role in the
dissemination of new TV styles and the transformation of Chinese
culture. It is impossible for even the monopoly mainland stations
such the CCTV to remain una¤ected by shifts in media discourse
knocking at the door from Hong Kong. The horizon of presentational
expectations amongst millions of Chinese viewers is gradually and in-
evitable tuned to the seductive Phoenix styles.
3. By far the most drastic global transformation of all cultures however,
including China’s, is e¤ected indirectly, I suggest, by the unstoppable
penetration of the bit stream itself. Its peculiar semiotic, as sketched
above, is beginning to reshape human behaviour in profound and
already observable ways. In China, an entire generation of young
people are feared to unlearn the proper writing of Chinese characters
because it is so much easier to type the pinyin representation of the
spoken form into the laptop or the SMS of the mobile phone, leaving
the instant and seemingly e¤ortless encryption into Hanzi to the ma-
chine. Furthermore, the user friendly bit stream obliges by o¤ering a
number of instant alternative phrases, relieving users of the task of
constructing their own well thought through message. This situation
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seriously undermines the mastery of Chinese syntax, especially the
traditional penchant for the four term phrase, which functions as idi-
omatic expression, linking present day Chinese with traditional po-
etry. Should we not also call this a form of intercultural imperialism?
Perhaps. One thing seems certain. In terms of speed and accuracy of
communication, the stylish metaphoricity of Chinese writing is no
match for the Boolean simpliﬁcation of discourse, a semiotic that
has its roots in the celebration of instrumental reason and techno-
logos of the European Enlightenment.
3.4. Culture as pyramid
If this is so, how is culture a¤ected by the bit stream in principle? Let me
simplify matters by proposing a schema with two limiting cases and a
spectrum of di¤erent cultural pyramids in between, in order to present a
possible scenario of the digital e¤ects of global interculturality.
The two limiting cases, mere thought experiments of course, illustrate
the task of the two axes. The vertical axis indicates the degree of cultural
values and their top-down organization. One could also refer to this axis
as the axis of semantics. The horizontal axis indicates syntax, or ordered
progression in time, with the baseline representing the syntax of the digi-
tal bit stream. Where the cultural or semantic axis quantiﬁes the ‘value
di¤erentiation’ or ‘committed di¤erentiation’ of a culture in relation to
its apex and baseline, the base line represent ‘mere’ or ‘indi¤erent dif-
ference.’ Fundamentalist belief systems could be allocated at the left
side of the chart, with increasingly value indi¤erent cultures towards
the right side of the chart. The limiting case of an ahistorical cultural
pyramid in which everything is entirely controlled top-down by its apex
or a ‘summum bonum’ could be contrasted with its imaginable other,
a culture that has totally exhausted its value system, transformed into
a ﬂat-line culture indistinguishable from its indi¤erent base of mere
di¤erentiation.
3.5. Culture kills
We tend to celebrate cultures as human achievements. Rarely do we take
a hard look at our own culture in terms of its brutality and the damage it
has done to others. If we believe certain statistics, more than 250 million
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say that ‘Culture Kills.’ The higher and steeper the pyramid, the more
exclusively dominated its social relations, the more likely that it is mur-
derous. German fascism was such a pyramid, unique because of its mon-
strosity and the brief time it took to construct. If the Spanish monks had
not burned over 200 books recording several hundred years or more of
Mayan history, beliefs and art, we would ﬁnd it a lot easier today to
translate the Mayan language.
  
 
Figure 1. Culture Chart
A — the steep cultural pyramid of tightly controlled societies with a summum bonum as
apex. They are characterised by the subordination of reason to the apex of the value pyramid
and strict hierarchization of social norms. Examples are the medieval Christian Church, vari-
ous forms of Fascism, Stalinism, Maoism or Islamism.
B — the ﬂattened pyramid of secular, advanced capitalist societies. Characterised by the ab-
sence of tight control from the apex. Instead there is value competition at all levels and the di-
versiﬁcation of reason (multiplicity of institutions, generation of ever new forms of reasoning
and their concomitant political, legal, commercial, and technological manifestations). At this
historical moment this type of pyramid also displays speciﬁcally the rapid expansion of digital,
instrumental reason.
C — robotics is the moment where social value hierarchisation is ﬂattened out entirely into
the base syntax of the Boolean binary-digital bitstream. Reason is one-dimensional, mere bi-
nary sequence, and all there is.
This arrangement suggests two idealized, limiting cases, between which social actuality oc-
curs: (I) the limiting case of the absolute, totalitarian state, where all values are subsumed un-
der monolithic control and (II) the limiting case of total syntactic control, the robotic society,
where all value is neutralized in the syntax of the system.
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Another aspect of culture and interculturality one may wish to draw from
our simple chart is the idea that Christianity is probably no longer a re-
ligion but a pro-ligion. In a tight religious pyramid, such as the Catholi-
cism of the Middle Ages, with the Inquisition guarding its spiritual bor-
ders, believers were back-bound, or re-ligati, to an authority whose stabil-
ity and permanence was guaranteed, at least sometimes, by a powerful
papal hierarchy. Similarly, certain fundamentalist conceptions of Islam to-
day. Perhaps the only truly religious person is someone prepared to kill
himself (and a few others) to protect the greater glory of the apex of the
pyramid. By contrast, Christianity has turned pragmatic, re-deﬁning its
God forward to guarantee his approval of the Bank of the Vatican: a pro-
ligion. The other not so scholarly suspicion I draw from the chart is that
the present suicidal religiosity is directed against the US military and its
commerce only at the surface, while deep down it is a desperate expression
of the realization that instrumental reason in its digital form has already
declared any serious religiosity an historically redundant and misguided
fantasy. And where better to strike than at the frontier of digital research?
3.7. The paradox of digital interculturality
Much as the cultural pyramid can be replicated and coded in the digital
bit stream and reconstituted in its full semiotic richness by members of
the culture for a while, over time its very digitization will gradually un-
dermine and ultimately deny its existence. For it is the culture’s Vorstel-
lungswelt that has sustained its observable cultural practice. The new Vor-
stellungswelt characterized by digital practices is by deﬁnition at odds
with the traditional ways in which perception and fantasy contributed to
the life of the culture. But cultures always change, we may object. Indeed,
they do, and change is part of the very notion of culture. Yet there is a
new di¤erence, di¤erent from all previous di¤erences. The pyramid is no
longer merely shape shifting; rather, it is relentlessly drawn towards its se-
mantic, though not semiotic, death. We are dealing here with a new form
of semiosis, a semiosis without semantics. (Chesher 1997: 86) As Baudril-
lard has told us, in the digital world meaning is fatal (Baudrillard 1990).
4. The corporeal turn
No semantics, no meaning, no iconicity, no Vorstellung. Is this a plausible
scenario? And is this a likely basis for the description of natural language?
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grounds that it introduced a subjective component, the semiotics of calcu-
lus took possession of natural language semantics. A further step in the
same direction occurred with the post-Saussurean reduction of language
to signiﬁers in di¤erential relations, or syntax. As Todorov once pressed
the point, ‘a word’s meaning is the sum of its possible relations with other
words’ (1977: 24). So put, language is indeed no more than chess. But to
say that French is like chess is nonsense. French is indeed like chess at
the level of syntax. However, without paying serious attention to its
semantic-pragmatic dimension, the linguist produces a false picture. It
would seem then that our theories of language have been too eager to re-
main in touch with the semiotics of formal propositions at the expense of
the theorization of the linguistic signiﬁed as iconic conceptualisation.
It was Merleau-Ponty who shifted phenomenology towards granting
‘primacy’ to perception, and so to claim the role of father of the ‘corpo-
real turn.’ Though attention to perceptual being in the world as well as
the Vorstellungswelt had been a legitimate domain within Husserl’s frame
of inquiry, Husserl’s own heady focus retarded attention to the body.
And although Roman Ingarden’s work on the constitution of complex
objects, such as the literary work, did draw attention to the role of Vor-
stellung, it was Merleau-Ponty who forcefully ﬁlled this gap by redirecting
phenomenology in a way that has been much more inﬂuential on current
thinking than tends to be acknowledged. In the ﬁnal analysis, however,
Merleau-Ponty (1964: 25) failed his own program by falling back on the
concession of a ‘nascent logos’ underlying everything, a leap of faith that
deﬁes philosophical, though not semiotic, explanation. All we can do is to
speculate that it was his Catholicism that made him qualify his audacious
stance. How else could he convince himself to write that there is, after all,
‘an essence beneath us, a common nervure of the signifying and the signi-
ﬁed’? (Merleau-Ponty 1968: 118)
From a semiotic perspective, the shift towards perception was a timely
reminder that the ‘linguistic turn’ had outlived its usefulness, certainly in
its strong version. In its modest form, the linguistic turn rightly pointed to
the fact that our means of representation are not fully transparent or neu-
tral with respect to what we are representing. In particular, all linguistic
representation carries with it the e¤ects of the way we formulate our phil-
osophical problems. Nor is it possible to eliminate the ﬁlter of language
from our descriptions. In its strong version, however, the linguistic turn
has been fatal for the discussion of iconicity in representation and Vorstel-
lung. Not only did the linguistic turn, as Richard Rorty has observed, re-
place talk of experience and representation by talk of the medium itself,
language (Rorty 1992: 373), the linguistic turn has also made it impossible
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guistic turn, I suggest, has gone berserk. To say that we can experience
only what we can express in language is a serious shrinking of our semi-
otic activities to symbolicity. This is particularly prejudicial if we hold a
view of language that is essentially syntactic, or even reduced to the dif-
ferential relations of ‘mere,’ ‘ﬂoating,’ or more recently ‘ﬂickering’ signi-
ﬁers (Hayles 1993: 76). It is noteworthy that Jacques Derrida has clearly
distanced his work from this kind of reductionism: ‘we cannot do without
the concept of the sign’ in its ‘radical di¤erence between the signiﬁer and
the signiﬁed’ (Derrida 1978: 281). That the elimination of the signiﬁed
should nevertheless by so popular in a discipline such as Cultural Studies
is ironic since it moves our conception of language close to formal signiﬁ-
cation and so forecloses the very subject matters at the heart of ‘culture,’
cultural di¤erence, interculturality and questions of power. It would seem
then that the ‘corporeal turn’ is a signiﬁcant and timely intervention. But
to be successful, it needs to go well beyond Merleau-Ponty’s opening ges-
ture. And so it has in a number of approaches.
4.1. Neurolinguistics: Embodied concepts and embodied realism
One such approach has recently been well publicized from the camp of
neurolinguistics. In their book Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied
Mind — A Challenge to Western Thought, Lako¤ and Johnson (1999)
have contributed a forceful argument in favor of restoring corporeality
to the study of language and the human imagination. They do so from
neurological premises, with key notions such as ‘embodied concepts’ and
‘embodied realism.’ Accordingly, ‘an embodied concept is a neural struc-
ture that is actually part of, or makes use of, the sensorimotor system of
our brains. Much of conceptual inference is, therefore, sensorimotor
inference’ (Lako¤ and Johnson 1999: 20). From this they argue that ‘if
concepts are ... embodied in the strong sense, the philosophical conse-
quences are enormous. The locus of reason (conceptual inference) would
be the same as the locus of perception and motor control, which are
bodily functions’ (Lako¤ and Johnson 1999: 20). Furthermore, ‘the very
properties of concepts are created as a result of the way the brain and
body are structured and the way they function in interpersonal rela-
tions and in the physical world.’ (Lako¤ and Johnson 1999: 20). One
consequence of this position is that ‘the embodied-mind hypothesis there-
fore radically undercuts the perception/conception distinction. In an em-
bodied mind, it is conceivable that the same neural system engaged in
perception (or in bodily movement) plays a central role in conception
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plausible that reason has grown out of the sensory and motor systems
and that it still uses those systems or structures developed from them.
This explains why we have the kinds of concepts we have and why our
concepts have the properties they have’ (Lako¤ and Johnson 1999: 38).
The metaphysical consequences of this picture are described by the au-
thors as a movement from the stipulation of an ‘embodied mind’ that
‘thus leads us to a philosophy of embodied realism’ (Lako¤ and Johnson
1999: 44).
The Lako¤ and Johnson position is persuasive in that it o¤ers an argu-
ment for the bridging of the gap between language and perception, a
move desperately needed to balance existing linguistic theorisation. Icon-
icity, although not part of their vocabulary, can now re-enter the de-
bate about the linguistic sign via the neurological notion of ‘mapping’
which we share in principle with other organisms. Leaving aside the anti-
Western philosophy hype of Philosophy in the Flesh, the book’s main ﬂaw
is its inability to give a satisfactory account of the social. Ironically, this
blind spot seems to be a result of precisely the kind of empirical science
orientation of which the book is so proud. Without any speculative
theory of language, the empirical evidence of neural science proves too
blunt an instrument with which to explain what happens when we com-
municate linguistically. In spite of all of Lako¤’s previous work, one
wonders what kind of theory of language they are advocating. Lako¤
and Johnson, I think, need to show how exactly the sound sequences of
linguistic expressions are typically ‘ﬁlled’ with perceptual and sensorimo-
tor content. Before we can understand the terms ‘embodied meaning’ or
‘embodied language,’ we need to address the relationship between percep-
tual grasp, such as tactile, aural, olfactory, or visual patterning and the
way such ‘readings’ in-form words and phrases. Since there is no empiri-
cal evidence of how we get from neural pathways of a perceptual and
sensorimotor type to the manner in which we activate linguistic sound
sequences, we need a speculative theory to link the two. Unfortunately,
Lako¤ and Johnson despise speculative theorizing and so deprive them-
selves, and us, of several important steps towards a picture of how lan-
guage works (Ruthrof 2004).
What are these speculative steps? First, we need an account of how lan-
guage means. This, according to their own premises, requires an alterna-
tive to the deﬁnitional approach (meanings are in dictionaries) and the
syntactic solution (meaning emerges from di¤erential syntactic relations);
second, we must give an explanation of the way perceptual structures are
meaningful in themselves, such that they become compatible with linguis-
tic expressions. One fruitful way to do this is via a general semiotics (in
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signs can be related to linguistic formation to constitute the linguistic
sign. Third, we should avoid the charge of mentalism and subjectivity
theorizing how culture functions in the processes of language acquisition
and the monitoring of language use; and fourth, we must grapple with
the metaphysics underlying such a theory, a layer usually concealed in
linguistics.
As it stands, Philosophy in the Flesh o¤ers too ontic a notion of coher-
ence, and if viewed as a heuristic, the book works with too narrow an in-
terpretive frame. By contrast, a speculative corporeal pragmatics accepts
the embodied mind hypothesis as a primitivum, while reaching well be-
yond neurological insights. Perhaps these limitations could have been
avoided if they had acknowledged compatible positions in speculative phi-
losophy and in particular the groundbreaking work of Charles Sanders
Peirce.
4.2. Semiotics from Peirce to Kristeva
Crucial to my argument in this paper is Peirce’s insistence on the primacy
of iconicity. According to Peirce, humans are unable to interpret their
world without transforming their signs into ‘iconic’ signs, that is, signs
that in some way stand in a representational relation to their objects. ‘Ev-
ery assertion must contain an icon or a set of icons, or else must contain
signs where meaning is only explicable by icons’ (CP 1.158). In short,
human interpretants are typically and ultimately iconic. This does not
preclude our ability to construe pure symbolicity in formal logic. What
Peirce insists on is that to make symbolicity imaginable requires a transla-
tion into iconic signs. Let me try out two illustrations:
Example 1: speed, acceleration, accelerated acceleration, etc., expressed in
symbolic terms.
Velocity: v ¼ s : t
Acceleration: a ¼ s : t   t ¼ s : t2
Accelerated Acceleration: aa ¼ s : t   t   t ¼ s : t3
Acceleration of aa: aaa ¼ s : t4
The mathematical formulations carry on, but we soon begin to fail to
be able to imagine the kinds of human situations they are meant to
represent.
Example 2: Heisenberg’s description of the ‘cut’ in the ‘uncertainty
principle.’
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famous fuzziness in the description of subatomic events to an incommen-
surable ‘cut’ [Schnitt] between the discourse of classical physics on the ob-
server side and the formal language that describes the object relations in
the atom, two semiotic systems for which Jakobson’s ‘intersemiotic trans-
lation’ would prove problematic. Heisenberg points to a ‘strange contra-
diction’ [Zwiespalt] in the description of what occurs. ‘On the one hand,
the experimental questions which we ask nature are always formulated
with the help of the imaginable concepts of classical physics, using espe-
cially the concepts of space and time of perception ... On the other
hand, the mathematical constructs suited to the representation of experi-
mental states of a¤airs are wave functions in multidimensional spaces of
conﬁguration that do not permit simple, imaginable interpretation.’ (Hei-
senberg 1987 [1934]: 438–501, my translation, emphasis added). As a
result of this contradiction, Heisenberg speaks of ‘the necessity to make
a cut in the description of atomic events between the measuring instru-
ments of the observer, which are described by way of classical concepts,
and the object of observation, the behaviour of which is represented by a
wave function.’ Heisenberg is adamant that ‘on both sides of the cut, one
the side of the observer, as well as on the side of the object of observation
all relations are sharply determined — here by the laws of classical phys-
ics, there by the di¤erential calculus of quantum mechanics’ (Heisenberg
1987 [1934]: 438–501, my translation, emphasis added). This incommen-
surability of two sign systems results in a ‘barrier for the applicability of
classical concepts’ that limits the ‘degree of precision’ of classical descrip-
tions in the subatomic domain. Yet it is this very ‘limitation of precision’
that allows us to connect ‘particle and wave pictures,’ a linkage not per-
missible in the formulations of quantum mechanics. For ‘nowhere does
quantum mechanics leave room for a supplementation of its propositions’
(Heisenberg 1987 [1934]: 438–501, my translation). The only area where
indeterminacy applies is the cut. Given this situation, Heisenberg suggests
that we will probably have to abandon the idea of ever again being able
to reconcile these descriptions under ‘an objective time scale shared by all
observers’ (Heisenberg 1987 [1934]: 438–501, my translation; Ruthrof
2004).
For our discussion here this means that the ‘imaginable concepts of
classical physics’ that Heisenberg identiﬁes, an iconic sign system, cannot
be translated into non-imaginable functions without serious distortion.
The human scale semiosis, which informs classical physics, is what we
need to be able to relate to symbolic representations at scales beyond the
human perceptual range of conception, beyond Peirce’s iconicity. In Hei-
senberg’s domain of quantum mechanics only symbolicity can account
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the limiting case where Peirce’s insistence on the translation between dif-
ferent sign systems fails. At the same time, the Heisenberg example forces
us to accept that human perceptual, corporeal, or iconic grasp is an inap-
propriate tool for the description of certain scientiﬁc domains.
The semiotician in the Saussurean tradition who has best been able to
embrace corporeality as a crucial ingredient of our linguistic acts is Julia
Kristeva. I ﬁnd it striking that she does not do so in her linguistic work,
which remains faithful to the post-Saussurean syntactic emphasis. It is in
her psychoanalytic writing, especially in a slim volume, In the Beginning
Was Love: Psychoanalysis and Faith (1987) that Kristeva o¤ers a perspec-
tive on the role which our somatic and other corporeal processes play in
language. Here she develops a ‘powerful model of the human in which
language is not divorced from the body; ‘‘word’’ and ‘‘ﬂesh’’ can meet
at any moment, for better or for worse’ (Kristeva 1987: 6). Thus has
Kristeva opened the door also for the structuralist tradition to review
Saussure’s remarks on the signiﬁed as ‘concept’ or ‘image’. Vorstellung
has re-entered the semantic arena.
Other feminist writers, such as Irigaray (1985) or Cixous (1997), have
celebrated nonverbal signiﬁcation, especially the tactile, as a political
program without however proceeding to a cogent theorisation of how to
return corporeality to language as a matter of necessity (Ruthrof 2000:
109–115). Nor is the path towards such an argument available to us as
proposed by Pamela Banting in ‘The Body as Pictogram: Rethinking Hel-
ene Cixous’s ecriture feminine’ (1992). She sees Jakobson’s ‘intersemiotic
translation’ as theoretical platform for Cixous’s demands. But this seems
to be barred by the speciﬁcs of Jakobson’s formulations. Jakobson’s inter-
semiotic translation is a ‘can rule,’ not a ‘must rule.’ Accordingly, we are
able to translate a sculpture into a written text, just as we are able to illu-
minate a written text by a ﬁlmic transformation. Crucially however, we
do not have to do so. Each of Jakobson’s semiotic systems, the verbal,
the visual, the tactile, the auditory, are autonomous semantic domains:
they mean by themselves. If this is so, then the addition of corporeality
in its tactile or sonoric forms is no more than a commendable option
that can enrich our signiﬁeds, but not a necessary semantic linguistic
ingredient.
4.3. Corporeal pragmatics
This is why in my own work on corporeal semantics/pragmatics I have
insisted that language is meaningless unless and until its signiﬁers are
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than a syntactically ordered matrix of semantically empty signiﬁers wait-
ing to be turned into full linguistic signs by nonverbal signiﬁcation. At the
level of the signiﬁed we are iconic beings. I suggest that nonverbal human
signiﬁcation as it occurs in perception and acts of fantasy, in short in our
Vorstellungswelt, constitutes the deep structure of natural language. The
position of corporeal pragmatics can be summarily formulated in four
broad stages:
1. Redeﬁnition of the linguistic sign (activation of signiﬁers by non-
verbal signs);
2. The role of culture (pedagogy of selection of appropriate nonverbal
signs);
3. Control mechanisms (‘su‰cient semiosis’ replacing truth-conditions);
4. Metaphysical frame (role of deep or ‘noumenal’ constraints ﬁltered
by culture).
The nonverbal here is the indispensable semantic component that al-
lows us to turn signiﬁers into signiﬁeds and so into full linguistic signs.
Nonverbal semiosis both in its iconic read-only version as it appears in
perception (ROSS), together with its communicative variety (COSS), pro-
vides the reservoir on which we draw when we interact meaningfully in
language. Interculturality, I suggest, powerfully supports such a theoreti-
cal scenario.
5. Conclusion: The centrality of Vorstellung
We may be machinic in continuously di¤erent forms, stone tool users,
beings of mechanics, industrial creatures, or digital beings. In all these hu-
man machinic formations, culturally organized Vorstellungen are central
to how we function. The Fregean tradition violently disagrees. As Quine,
for example, tells us in Pursuit of Truth, ‘In psychology one may or may
not be a behaviourist, but in linguistics one has no choice ... There is
nothing in linguistic meaning beyond what is to be gleaned from overt
behaviour in observable circumstances’ (Quine 1993: 37f.). No surprise
here, given the restricted deﬁnition of meaning that informs analytical
philosophy up to Davidson (Davidson 1979). A few pages later, however,
Quine runs into an entirely predictable contradiction. He has to concede
that ‘empathy dominates the learning of language, both by the child and
the ﬁeld linguist ... We all have an uncanny knack for empathizing an-
other’s perceptual situation ...’ (Quine 1993: 42). And four pages down
we ﬁnd that ‘practical psychology is what sustains our radical translator
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ines himself in the native’s situation as best he can’ (Quine 1993: 46).
Let me return to Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations for a mo-
ment to demonstrate a similar tension. While he is committed to looking
at language in its publicly demonstrable ‘use,’ he again and again em-
ploys phrases such as ‘imagine a situation in which ...’ (polysemiotic
and heterosemiotic) rather than ‘take a sentence such as ...’ (monosemi-
otic and homosemiotic). Even in order to shrink his students’ attention to
the narrow focus on what features of the language game meet the eye and
ear, he needs to invoke the larger intersemiotic frame of an imagined so-
cial situation. ‘Let us imagine a language ...’ (PI: 2); ‘Imagine a script
...’(PI: 3); ‘We could imagine that ...’ (PI: 6); ‘Imagine someone saying
...’ (PI: 14); ‘It is easy to imagine a language consisting ...’ (PI: 19);
‘Imagine a language game in which ...’ (PI: 21); ‘We could imagine a lan-
guage in which ...’ (PI: 21); ‘Imagine a picture representing a boxer ...’
(PI: 23n); ‘One can also imagine someone’s having learnt ...’ (PI: 31);
‘Can we not now imagine further rules ...’ (PI: 86); in Wittgenstein’s
German, the verbs he employs vary from vorstellen to denken and other
phrases of conjecture. Likewise, we ﬁnd many phrases such as the paren-
thetic, that is, begrudgingly conceded ‘(Das Aussprechen eines Wortes is
gleichsam ein Anschlagen einer Taste auf dem Vorstellungsklavier)’ [(Ut-
tering a word is like striking a note on the keyboard of the imagination)]
(author’s translation, PI: 6), on an ‘imaginary piano,’ another cluster of
iconic signs. If the medium is the message, then Wittgenstein’s illustra-
tions speak more loudly than his propositions.
In practice, intercultural negotiation, in itself not a linguistic but an in-
tersemiotic activity, is sustained by the productive play of Vorstellung, the
behaviourist’s, the logician’s, and the syntactician’s nightmare. Given dig-
ital advances, we can predict with some conﬁdence that Vorstellung will
soon be displayed, measured and triumphantly incorporated in Quine’s
schema by his successors. Quine regards understanding as ‘a statistical
e¤ect’ which ‘resides in multiplicities’ (Quine 1993: 59). For Quine, ‘the
nucleus is the word, and the mass is made up by the countless sentences
in which the word occurs’ (Quine 1993: 59). This is the clever but sadly
limited result of a su¤ocating frame of inquiry. What actually occurs is
that in mutual understanding, we have successfully negotiated the way in
which we activate the empty linguistic schemata of words in discourse
with appropriate Vorstellungen, that is, culturally guided, internalised
clusters of iconic signs, and not just of the visual variety.
While Vorstellung is an embarrassment to post-Saussurean linguists
and post-Fregean philosophers alike, in intercultural negotiation it is
ubiquitous. It appears in
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smell, touch)
— representation (realist) as the Vorstellung of the absent
— memory as the Vorstellung of the past (e.g., a painful emotion)
— prediction as the Vorstellung of the future
— suggestion as the Vorstellung of the tentative
— certitude as the Vorstellung of what seems compelling
— hope as the Vorstellung of what we wish will be the case
— fantasy as the Vorstellung of the possible and impossible
— dream as the Vorstellung of the unconscious
— hallucination as the Vorstellung of the counter-factual
— utopia as the Vorstellung of a desirable world
— dystopia as the Vorstellung of a catastrophic world
With the prominence of language, perceptual being appears to have
largely gone ‘underground’ as Vorstellung, from where it transforms the
signiﬁers of all natural languages into iconic signiﬁeds, concrete and ab-
stract. Human epistemology arises out of the body, the result of auto-
poietic evolution. It is this shared corporeality which, in spite of cultural
di¤erence, makes translation and interculturality possible.
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